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We investigate the change in adjustment speed of debt maturity for East Asian firms 
between 1990 and 2017 by including two exogenous shocks: the Asian Financial Crisis 
1997-1998 (AFC) and the Global Financial Crisis 2007-2009 (GFC). We employ the 
least square dummy variable correction and find that East Asian firms have a slower 
adjustment of long-term debt over time. Besides, the decrease in adjustment speed of 
long-term debt after the GFC is more compared to the decrease after the AFC. Further 
analysis shows the optimal debt maturity differs across countries and industries. 
Another important implication of our results is that firms in high governance countries 
are more likely to close the gap between the actual and target debt maturity in time. 
Overall, debt holders and investors should consider financial uncertainties.
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I. INTRODUCTION
East Asian economies suffered from two significant financial crises in the last 
decades. The Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998 (AFC) originated from Thailand 
and impacted other Asian countries with catastrophic effects on their economies. 
Then the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2007 spread rapidly across the world 
as well as the Asian region. Both events provide a unique natural experiment to 
understand the effect of financial instability on the real economy, especially on the 
debt maturity structure of firms. This study analyzes how these crises impacted 
the optimal debt maturity decisions of East Asian firms by providing evidence 
from both before and after AFC and the GFC. 
The East Asian region is unique to study the capital structure and debt maturity 
choice of firms. The AFC experience had a long-lasting impact on East Asian firms’ 
corporate decisions. After the AFC, there was a regime change in demand function 
of cash holdings (Song and Lee, 2012), which in turn also may shift leverage 
and debt maturity choice of East Asian firms. In that sense, East Asian firms are 
different from firms in developed countries in their cash and leverage policies. 
Another important advantage of studying East Asian firms is that because they 
were impacted by the AFC, one can check whether the GFC had a different impact 
on East Asian firms’ debt/leverage decisions. 
The optimal debt maturity is a vital decision for firms not only to maximize 
their value but also to prevent the probability of bankruptcy during financial 
downturns. The maturity structure is also significantly affected by the availability 
and terms of credit. During financially distressed times and in its aftermath, 
information asymmetry forces firms to borrow short term since long term 
borrowing comes with significant informational costs due to investors willing to 
lend only for higher premiums in the long term. This makes short-term lending 
more attractive (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2020) and reduces debt maturity. Previous 
research investigates the association between the financial crisis and optimal debt 
financing. Zeitun et al. (2017) investigate the effect of GFC on the capital structure 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and show that leverage ratios 
decrease due to a decrease in lending. They also argue that adjustment speeds of 
leverage ratios are much slower after the crisis. Tsoy and Heshmati (2019) show 
that the GFC has a positive effect on the adjustment speed of leverage for Korean 
firms, unlike the AFC. Compared to earlier literature, this study fills the gap by 
exploring how financial crises affected East Asian firm’s debt maturity choice in a 
dynamic setting. 
We sample firms from eight East Asian countries and employ the Least Squares 
Dummy Variable Correction (LSDVC) approach. We show that optimal debt 
maturity shortens over the sample period 1990-2017. Specifically, firms gradually 
decrease their long-term debt adjustment after the GFC than after the AFC. The 
reason for this result is probably due to a decrease in credit supply since lending 
reduced during the GFC (Gonzalez, 2015). Another reason which may intensify 
the supply-side effect is that firms increase their short-term borrowing since long-
term debt becomes expensive during and after a financial crisis creating a demand 
side effect which decreases long-term borrowing. Our additional results show that 
the adjustment speed differs across countries and industries. Moreover, we find 
that governance affects the debt maturity choice. We show that firms operating in 
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high governance countries have faster adjustment speeds in all subperiods than 
those in low governance countries. Similar to our main findings, firms in both high 
and low governance countries decrease their adjustment speed over time.
 The findings from this study make several contributions to the current 
literature. First, previous research outlines the importance of East Asia and 
exogenous shocks (Sawicki, 2009; Song and Lee, 2012; Arslan-Ayaydin et al., 
2014; Attig et al., 2016). We extend the literature along the lines of optimal debt 
maturity in the financial crisis context in East Asia. Second, this is the first study 
to provide evidence that the financial crises shorten optimal debt maturity owing 
to the shrinkage of credit supply and decreasing demand for long-term credit for 
East Asian firms. Third, we use a dynamic setting for debt maturity which is an 
important element to understand the transmission channel of financial crises on 
the real economy. Fourth, Tsoy and Heshmati (2019) focus on Korean firms’ capital 
structure, our study differs from them by providing an understanding of how the 
credit supply channel affects firms’ optimal debt maturity structure for East Asian 
firms. Fifth, we believe that our work is the first to show that the governance level 
affects the adjustment speed of debt maturity for East Asian firms.
II. OPTIMAL DEBT MATURITY AND FINANCIAL CRISES
Unlike the Modigliani and Miller (1958) world where there are no frictions, 
trade-off theory considers the benefits and costs of debt financing (Kraus and 
Litzenberger, 1973). Debt comes with tax and agency advantages but also includes 
costs arising from financial distress and agency. Trade-off theory implies that 
there will be an optimal debt level which balances a dynamic trade-off between 
the costs and benefits (Fischer et al., 1989). Another indirect implication of trade-off 
theory is that there will be an optimal debt maturity structure for firms considering 
lending conditions, informational and agency related costs. Firms may overcome 
the underinvestment problem and the asset substitution problem to signal their 
high-quality by issuing short-term debt.1 
Financial downturns are expected to have a significant effect on both capital 
structure and term maturity. Alves and Francisco (2015), focusing on 43 countries 
and in a static setting, show that during financial crisis firms use short-term 
debt rather than long-term debt. For a sample of 39 countries, Gonzalez (2015) 
investigates the impact of the global financial crisis on corporate debt maturity. 
He shows that short-term debt increased more than long-term debt resulting in 
a reduction in debt maturity. He also finds that the reduction in corporate debt 
maturity is higher for firms that depend on external finance more heavily. 
The literature also focuses on the shortage of credit during a crisis which 
implies a sharp decrease in lending (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). D’Amato 
(2020) analyzes the effect of the GFC on the capital structure choice of Italian 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). He finds that credit supply shocks 
reduced Italian SMEs’ leverage significantly. They especially decreased their 
short-term borrowing compared to the period before the crisis. He claims that the 
short-term borrowing channel is more sensitive to the supply shocks. Duchin et 
1 See Ozkan (2000) for a specific discussion of theories related to debt maturity. 
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al. (2010) investigate the impact of the 2008 subprime crisis on the US publicly 
traded firms. Their results show that credit supply channel negatively affected 
firms’ investment and this effect continued even after the crisis due to the demand 
channel. Campello et al. (2010) survey corporate managers and show that due to 
the lack of funds during the crisis firms either cancelled or postponed investments.
Zeitun et al. (2017) investigate the effect of the GFC on the capital structure 
of the GCC countries and show that leverage ratios decrease due to a decrease in 
lending. Tsoy and Heshmati (2019) focusing only on Korea find that AFC and GFC 
have a different impact on leverage choices of Korean firms. Analyzing the GCC 
countries, Mimouni et al. (2019) examine the impact of the GFC on corporate debt 
maturity and find a negative impact of the GFC on long-term debt. Van Hoang 
et al. (2018) investigate the effect of the GFC on French micro-enterprises’ capital 
structure. They show that during the GFC micro-enterprises financed themselves 
mainly through short-term funds to maintain their flexibility. They also claim that 
the pecking order theory is better in explaining the financial decisions of French 
micro-enterprises. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2020) investigate the capital structure 
evolution of SMEs, large non-listed and listed companies for the period 2004-2011. 
They find that firms decrease both their leverage and debt maturity. They claim 
that the deleveraging is due to a decrease in long-term debt and the effect was 
more significant in the countries with weaker legal and banking systems. Their 
results support the view that for publicly listed firms, capital markets provide a 
“spare tire” in a financial crisis.
Agency costs are important determinants that affect firms’ choice of debt 
maturity (Ozkan, 2002). Short-term debt helps to limit the underinvestment 
problem (Myers, 1977). In addition, short-term debt mitigates asset substitution 
problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), since the firm needs to pay back its debt 
before any risky growth opportunity to be exercised (Barnea et al., 1980; Leland 
and Thoft, 1996). During a financial crisis uncertainty and cash flow volatility 
increases (Lozano and Yaman, 2020), which in turn make the asset substitution 
problem more severe resulting in increased agency costs. Thus, considering the 
moral hazard incentives of a borrower, lenders are reluctant to lend long-term in a 
high uncertainty environment. Also considering that during financial downturns 
firms face problems in accessing external finance, firms are expected to care less 
about reaching their target maturity after a crisis so that speed of adjustment may 
decrease. Another important impact of the crisis is that due to increasing funding 
costs arising from informational issues, firms are reluctant to borrow long-term in 
the aftermath of a crisis (Bae and Goyal, 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2020). Rather, 
they prefer short-term debt which implies a decrease in debt maturity.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the earlier studies in the literature focus 
specifically on the AFC and the GFC for the East Asian region in a dynamic setting 
in order to understand the effect of both crises on debt maturity structure. In this 
study, we investigate the effect of both the AFC and the GFC on the adjustment 
speed of debt maturity. Our main focus is to analyze the following questions: 
(i) What is the effect of these two crises in the long-run on the adjustment of 
debt maturity?; (ii) is the speed of adjustment across countries and industries 
heterogenous?; and iii) does the governance quality influence the adjustment 
speed of debt maturity.
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III. METHODOLOGY 
We use the Speed of Adjustment (SOA) model on optimal debt maturity in line with 
the literature (Ozkan, 2000; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Gonzalez, 2015; Zeitun et 
al., 2017; Dang et al., 2019). We state the basic SOA model of debt maturity below:
where DMi,t is the long-term debt to total debt of firm i at time t, λi is the adjustment 
parameter, and ɛi,t is the time-varying disturbance term.
(1)
where DMi,t* is a target debt maturity ratio, β is a coefficient vector and Xi,t−1 is a 
vector of firm characteristics considering the costs and benefits of debt maturity 
at time t −1.
After the substitution and rearrangement of Equations (1) and (2), the dynamic 
SOA model is as follows:
where λ is the adjustment speed. 
We test our hypotheses using the full dynamic SOA model of debt maturity 
below: 
where, DMi,t and DMi,t−1 are long-term debt to total debt for firm i at time t and t−1, 
respectively. Also, the model includes six more firm-level characteristics: firm size 
(SIZE), the market-to-book ratio (MBR), profitability (PROF), tangibility (TAN), 
dividends (DIV) and cash holdings (CASH) for firm i at time t−1. We use their one 
year lagged to reduce any simultaneity bias (D’Amato, 2020). Finally, αiFi and αtYt 
are firm- and year-fixed effects, respectively, controlling for unobservable factors 
which affect the debt maturity ratio, and εi,t is the error term. All variables are 
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We estimate the SOA of debt maturity using the LSDVC as Flannery and 
Hankins (2013) and Dang et al. (2015) suggest. They find that instrumental 
variables or bias-corrected estimators give correct results compared to Pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effects (FE), which are traditional panel 
data methods. While the system general methods of moments (GMM) of Blundell 
and Bond (1998) may mitigate the finite sample bias, the LSDVC overcomes the 
bias; that is why the LSDVC is more appropriate than the system GMM (Dang et 
al., 2015; Tekin, 2020a, 2020b). 
IV. DATA 
We retrieve the firm-level data from Worldscope in Datastream. Since East Asian 
countries have faced two financial crises in the last two decades, we analyze firms 
in eight East Asian countries. Using 101,932 firm-years representing 7,626 firms in 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan 
and Thailand2 for the period 1990-2017, we examine the dynamic debt maturity of 
East Asian firms excluding the crises periods3: (i) 1997-1998 for the AFC and (ii) 
2007-2009 for the GFC. 
We focus on non-financial firms by eliminating financial and utility firms 
because of their different accounting structure (Tekin, 2020b). We keep firms that 
have a minimum of four consecutive years of data in each subperiod to provide 
the consistency for our estimations (Coldbeck and Ozkan, 2018). The sample 
distribution across country and industry is shown in Table 2.
2 We select eight Asian countries that have been most affected by the Asian crisis 1997-1998, as Song 
and Lee (2012: 618) argue.
3 Since our interest is in analyzing optimal debt maturity before and after turbulence, we exclude both 




DM t Long-term debt / total debt Worldscope
DM t-1 Lagged [long-term debt / total debt] Worldscope
SIZE t-1 Lagged [the annual logarithm of total assets] Worldscope
MBR t-1
Lagged [(total assets − the book value of equity + the market value of equity) 
/ total assets] Worldscope
PROF t-1 Lagged [EBIT / total assets] Worldscope
TAN t-1 Lagged [net tangible assets / total assets] Worldscope
DIV t-1 Lagged [cash dividends paid / total assets] Worldscope
CASH t-1 Lagged [cash and short-term investments/ total assets] Worldscope
GOV t
Average of Worldwide Governance Indicators (control of corruption, rule of 




1990-1996 Dummy variable equals one for years 1990-1996, otherwise zero
1999-2006 Dummy variable equals one for years 1999-2006, otherwise zero
2010-2017 Dummy variable equals one for years 2010-2017, otherwise zero
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We also use lagged firm-level explanatory variables to overcome any 
endogeneity bias (D’Amato, 2020). Our firm-level control variables are firm size 
(Ozkan, 2002), market-to-book ratio (Gonzalez, 2015), profitability (Mimouni et 
al., 2019), tangibility (Fan et al., 2012), cash holdings (Brick and Liao, 2017) and 
dividends (Vermoesen et al., 2013). Besides, we also control the country-level by 
employing the governance (Turk Ariss, 2016) due to country-level heterogeneity 
in our sample. 
We winsorize all control variables at the top and bottom 1% (Tekin and Polat, 
2020a, 2020b). We present descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for three 
subperiods in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively. In Table 4, we report the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) that indicates whether the explanatory variables face any 
multicollinearity problem. Specifically, since the maximum VIF value is 1.36, our 
data do not suffer from multicollinearity (Freund et al., 2006).
Table 2.
Sample Distribution Across Country and Industry
Country # firms # N % N Industry # firms # N % N
1 Hong Kong 1,501 18,134 17.8 1 Basic Materials 829 12,212 12.0
2 Indonesia 389 5,600 5.5 2 Consumer Goods 1,614 22,620 22.2
3 Malaysia 804 12,184 12.0 3 Consumer Services 859 11,410 11.2
4 Philippines 150 2,484 2.4 4 Healthcare 421 4,699 4.6
5 Singapore 661 9,187 9.0 5 Industrials 2,483 32,662 32.0
6 South Korea 1,877 23,838 23.4 6 Oil & Gas 185 2,374 2.3
7 Taiwan 1,670 21,983 21.6 7 Technology 1,179 15,064 14.8
8 Thailand 574 8,522 8.4 8 Telecommunications 56 891 0.9




DMt SIZEt-1 MBRt-1 PROFt-1 TANt-1 DIVt-1 CASHt-1 GOVt
Panel A. 1990-1996 Mean 0.364 15.712 1.638 0.096 0.494 0.041 0.117 0.530
SD 0.301 3.042 0.974 0.070 0.203 0.137 0.131 0.539
Min 0.000 8.884 0.739 -0.047 0.091 0.000 0.000 -0.694
Median 0.343 15.068 1.311 0.085 0.493 0.013 0.072 0.556
Max 1.000 23.557 7.650 0.453 0.888 1.000 1.000 1.462
Panel B. 1999-2006 Mean 0.321 15.076 1.327 0.056 0.520 0.040 0.157 0.708
SD 0.321 3.109 1.126 0.141 0.228 0.158 0.157 0.579
Min 0.000 4.844 0.543 -0.528 0.015 0.000 0.000 -0.943
Median 0.235 14.509 1.012 0.064 0.525 0.001 0.108 0.776
Max 1.000 25.027 14.888 0.760 0.920 1.000 1.000 1.520
Panel C. 2010-2017 Mean 0.294 15.637 1.531 0.043 0.556 0.029 0.201 0.817
SD 0.321 3.124 1.559 0.145 0.215 0.104 0.178 0.588
Min 0.000 4.605 0.539 -0.847 0.118 0.000 0.000 -0.539
Median 0.174 15.096 1.093 0.054 0.559 0.004 0.150 0.823
Max 1.000 26.284 18.902 0.571 0.933 1.000 1.000 1.615
Source. Worldscope / Kaufmann et al. (2011)
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V. MAIN RESULTS
We compare the SOA of debt maturity of firms in East Asia from 1990 through 
2017 by dividing the sample into subperiods to understand the variation in SOA 
of debt maturity. We report results in Table 5.
Table 4.
Correlation Matrix
DMt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) VIF
Panel A. 1990-1996 (1) SIZEt-1 0.210 1.62
(2) MBRt-1 0.002 -0.277 1.39
(3) PROFt-1 -0.004 0.053 0.429 1.37
(4) TANt-1 -0.132 -0.378 0.223 0.169 1.26
(5) DIVt-1 -0.024 -0.037 0.080 0.104 0.061 1.04
(6) CASHt-1 0.037 -0.023 0.130 0.191 0.189 0.186 1.11
(7) GOVt 0.035 -0.448 0.011 -0.200 0.070 -0.024 0.042 1.33
Panel B. 1999-2006 (1) SIZEt-1 0.173 1.36
(2) MBRt-1 -0.011 -0.191 1.14
(3) PROFt-1 0.025 0.159 -0.022 1.12
(4) TANt-1 -0.202 -0.233 -0.007 0.236 1.30
(5) DIVt-1 -0.020 0.036 0.048 0.072 0.028 1.01
(6) CASHt-1 -0.137 -0.152 0.273 0.108 0.351 0.057 1.28
(7) GOVt -0.024 -0.413 0.089 -0.089 0.119 0.018 0.197 1.24
Panel C. 2010-2017 (1) SIZEt-1 0.107 1.21
(2) MBRt-1 -0.014 -0.118 1.10
(3) PROFt-1 0.009 0.165 -0.052 1.13
(4) TANt-1 -0.193 -0.224 0.029 0.166 1.29
(5) DIVt-1 -0.021 -0.075 0.139 0.171 0.097 1.07
(6) CASHt-1 -0.160 -0.199 0.237 0.087 0.401 0.115 1.36
(7) GOVt -0.044 -0.278 -0.007 -0.132 0.025 -0.022 0.222 1.16
Source. Worldscope / Kaufmann et al. (2011)
Table 5. 
Adjustment Speed of Debt Maturity Before and After Financial Crises
This table shows the Least Square Dummy Variable Correction (LSDVC) regression estimates the adjustment speed of 
long-term debt – the lagged long-term debt by controlling firm-level variables. The dependent variable is long-term 




DMt-1 0.392*** 0.416*** 0.455***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Controls
SIZEt-1 0.019 0.006 0.024***
(0.023) (0.010) (0.001)
MBRt-1 0.023* 0.007*** 0.006**
(0.012) (0.001) (0.003)
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The mean long-term debt decreases over time, as shown in Table 3. Similarly, 
the SOA of long-term debt decreases as presented in Table 5. Specifically, the 
coefficient of lagged long-term debt is 0.392. In other words, East Asian firms 
close the gap between actual and target debt maturity with 60.8% SOA, which is 
calculated as one minus the coefficient of lagged long-term debt. 
In the aftermath of the AFC (1999-2006), the supply of credit decreases. This 
results with a fall in SOA of long-term debt. The SOA of debt maturity decreases 
by 2.4% from pre- to post-AFC as shown in column II (the coefficient of lagged 
long-term debt becomes 0.416). 
Finally, from 2010 to 2017, the SOA of long-term debt drops from 58.4% to 
54.5% after the GFC (column III). Interestingly, the decrease in SOA of long-term 
debt after the GFC is 1.5% more compared to that after AFC. This may occur due 
to the severity of the GFC compared to the AFC and the shrinkage of credit supply. 
For example, Zeitun et al. (2017) examine the SOA of leverage for firms in the 
GCC countries before and after the GFC. They show that firms in GCC countries 
decrease their target leverage after the financial crisis because of decreasing credit 
supply. Moreover, firms are reluctant to borrow long-term during the GFC since 
it was too costly to get long-term debt due to informational issues (Campello et al., 
2010; Duchin et al., 2010). This, in turn, reduced long-term borrowing.
Regarding firm-level control variables, the coefficient and sign fluctuate across 
subperiods. Specifically, the positive relationship between firm size and debt 
maturity becomes significant in the last subperiod. Long-term debt is important for 
larger firms between 2010 and 2017 (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2020). This maybe due 
to increasing agency costs after the crisis which makes it harder to find long term 
debt at fair interest levels (Gürkaynak and Wright, 2012). Besides, the negative 
significance of market-to-book on long-term debt rise and fall. In other words, firms 
Table 5. 
Adjustment Speed of Debt Maturity Before and After Financial Crises (Continued)
Dependent variable: DMt
1990-1996 1999-2006 2010-2017
PROFt-1 −0.315*** 0.039 −0.019***
(0.084) (0.067) (0.001)
TANt-1 0.026 −0.092*** 0.010
(0.028) (0.029) (0.019)
DIVt-1 0.066*** −0.024 0.012
(0.025) (0.018) (0.021)




Firm FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓
# of firms 914 4,401 7,153
# of observations 2,940 22,110 47,154
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with high growth opportunities increase their long-term debt more in the 1999-
2006 period than in 2010-2017. Furthermore, firms with low profitability increase 
their long-term debt before 1999 and after 2006, but those with low tangibility rise 
it during 1999-2006. Interestingly, the dividend payment has only impacted debt 
maturity before the AFC, and cash holdings became significant after the AFC due 
to the transaction motive.
VI. ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
We do further analyses to understand how optimal debt maturity differs across 
(i) countries, (ii) industries, and (iii) governance for the subperiods: 1990-1996, 
1999-2006 and 2010-2017. Before regression analyses, we present the trend of debt 
maturity between 1990 and 2017 for each country, industry, and governance level 
in our sample by Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3, respectively. For brevity, we 
report only the coefficients of lagged long-term debt in Tables 6 and 7.
Figure 1. 
Trend of Debt Maturity Across Countries
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Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. 
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Table 6. 
Adjustment Speed of Debt Maturity by Country
This table shows the adjustment speed of long-term debt – the lagged long-term debt using the LSDVC across eight 
East Asian countries. The dependent variable is long-term debt – DM. Adjusted standard-errors are reported in 
parentheses (.). Observation numbers are reported italic in brackets [.].*** indicates significance at 1%.
Dependent variable: DM t
Country 1990-1996 1999-2006 2010-2017 Country 1990-1996 1999-2006 2010-2017
Hong Kong 0.435*** 0.419*** 0.445*** Singapore 0.295*** 0.371*** 0.504***
(0.055) (0.005) (0.001) (0.099) (0.018) (0.011)
[447] [3,920] [7,921] [277] [1,996] [4,156]
Indonesia 0.373*** 0.574*** 0.529*** South Korea 0.422*** 0.319*** 0.384***
(0.127) (0.021) (0.037) (0.002) (0.004) (0.012)
[310] [1,352] [2,335] [522] [4,663] [12,358]
Malaysia 0.387*** 0.593*** 0.614*** Taiwan 0.519*** 0.287*** 0.418***
(0.002) (0.027) (0.002) (0.067) (0.007) (0.002)
[517] [3,104] [5,428] [263] [4,533] [10,643]
Philippines 0.589*** 0.555*** 0.517*** Thailand 0.536*** 0.493*** 0.513***
(0.043) (0.025) (0.024) (0.041) (0.035) (0.013)
[120] [628] [948] [484] [1,914] [3,365]
Controls    Controls   
Firm FE    Firm FE   
Year FE    Year FE   
In Table 6, we repeat our analyses for each country: Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. While 
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the Philippines firms increase their target long-term debt level, firms in Malaysia 
and Singapore decrease their target long-term debt over time. Besides, Indonesian 
firms drop and raise their target long-term debt from 1990 to 2017, but it is the 
opposite for firms in Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. In period 
1990-1996, the Philippine and Singapore firms close the gap between actual and 
target long term debt with 41.1% as the slowest SOA and 70.5% as the fastest SOA, 
respectively. Then, the Asian 1997-1998 crisis occurred, and companies changed 
their debt maturity policies due to rising costs of accessing external finance and 
increasing costs of long-term borrowing. After the Asian crisis, firms in Malaysia 
and Taiwan have the slowest and fastest SOA of long-term debt with 40.7% and 
71.3% in that order during 1999-2006. Lastly, Malay and South Korean firms have 
the slowest and fastest SOA of long-term debt with 38.6% and 61.6%, respectively, 
in the period 2010-2017.
Figure 2. 
Trend of Debt Maturity Across Industries
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Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. 
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In Table 7, we compare the SOA of long-term debt across eight main industries. 
First, firms in consumer goods and consumer service industries decrease their SOA 
of debt maturity over time, and vice versa for health care firms. Next, contrary 
to industrial, technology and telecommunication firms, basic material and oil & 
gas firms decrease and increase their SOA of debt maturity after the AFC and the 
GFC, respectively. Interestingly, telecommunication firms have the lowest and the 
highest SOA of debt maturity before and after the AFC, respectively.
In Table 8, we also investigate the SOA of debt maturity across governance 
level for subperiods. East Asian firms decrease their SOA of debt maturity across 
the governance level over time. Specifically, firms in high governance countries 
have faster SOA of debt maturity than those in low governance countries.
Table 7. 
Adjustment Speed of Debt Maturity by Industry
This table shows the adjustment speed of long-term debt – the lagged long-term debt using the LSDVC across eight 
industries. The dependent variable is long-term debt – DM. Adjusted standard-errors are reported in parentheses 
(.). Observation numbers are reported italic in brackets [.].*** and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5%, respectively.












Basic Materials 0.379*** 0.503*** 0.447*** Industrials 0.443*** 0.416*** 0.468***
(0.026) (0.003) (0.006) (0.038) (0.000) (0.017)
[486] [2,881] [5,519] [860] [7,047] [15,292]
Consumer Goods 0.405*** 0.466*** 0.481*** Oil & Gas 0.410*** 0.469*** 0.431***
(0.024) (0.013) (0.000) (0.081) (0.049) (0.093)
[809] [5,393] [10,102] [68] [403] [1,165]
Consumer Service 0.381*** 0.409*** 0.454*** Technology 0.526*** 0.264*** 0.414***
(0.098) (0.033) (0.008) (0.169) (0.025) (0.002)
[488] [2,476] [4,903] [110] [2,807] [7,571]
Telecommunication 0.989** 0.285** 0.433*** Health Care 0.716*** 0.460*** 0.438***
(0.541) (0.139) (0.153) (0.044) (0.050) (0.004)
[35] [230] [386] [84] [873] [2,216]
Controls    Controls   
Firm FE    Firm FE   
Year FE    Year FE   
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Figure 3. 
Trend of Debt Maturity Across Governance Level
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Table 8. 
Adjustment Speed of Debt Maturity by Governance Level
This table shows the adjustment speed of long-term debt – the lagged long-term debt using the LSDVC across eight 
East Asian countries. The dependent variable is long-term debt – DM. Adjusted standard-errors are reported in 
parentheses (.). Observation numbers are reported italic in brackets [.].*** indicates significance at 1%.
Dependent variable: DM t
1990-1996 1999-2006 2010-2017 1990-1996 1999-2006 2010-2017
High GOV 0.366*** 0.391*** 0.422*** Low GOV 0.415*** 0.435*** 0.458***
(0.035) (0.041) (0.001) (0.069) (0.053) (0.015)
[987] [9,059] [19,913] [1,953] [15,206] [27,241]
Controls    Controls   
Firm FE    Firm FE   
Year FE    Year FE   
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
We investigate how recent financial crises influence the debt maturity decisions 
of East Asian firms by examining the optimal long-term debt before and after the 
financial crises. Employing firms from eight East Asian countries and the LSDVC, 
we show that optimal debt maturity shortens over the sample period 1990-2017. 
Specifically, the decrease in adjustment speed of long-term debt after the GFC is 
more than the decrease after AFC. This is probably due to the shrinkage of credit 
supply during the global financial crisis being more severe and firms facing bigger 
costs for borrowing.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, our findings show 
that East Asian firms decrease their adjustment speed of long-term debt over time. 
Second, we are the first study to focus on both the GFC and the AFC in the East 
Asian region and show that two financial crises shorten the optimal debt maturity 
implying a long-term change in firms maturity structure. Moreover, we find that 
governance affects optimal debt maturity. These results imply that firms should 
consider financial crises when they consider their debt maturity policy. Investors 
also should pay attention to market conditions.
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